BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
X-WR-CALNAME:EventsCalendar
PRODID:-//hacksw/handcal//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/New_York
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T053451Z
TZURL:https://www.tzurl.org/zoneinfo-outlook/America/New_York
X-LIC-LOCATION:America/New_York
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZNAME:EDT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
DTSTART:19700308T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=2SU
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZNAME:EST
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
DTSTART:19701101T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=11;BYDAY=1SU
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
CATEGORIES:College of Arts and Sciences,Thesis/Dissertations
DESCRIPTION:Target Audience: Faculty and & Staff Category: Thesis/Dissertat
 ion Defense Title of Defense: Masters Thesis Defense by Younan Chen Title 
 of Paper: The Effect of In-Person versus Remote Others on Moral Decision M
 aking Abstract: People often assume that moral decisions reflect stable in
 ternal moral values, yet moral judgments can be context-dependent, especia
 lly in high-conflict dilemmas that involve competing moral principles: uti
 litarianism (i.e., maximizing the greater good) versus deontology (i.e., p
 reventing intentional harm). One such context is perceived observation. Re
 search suggests that perceived observation is associated with higher rates
  of deontological judgments.  Prior work, however, has relied on highly u
 nrealistic hypothetical dilemmas in which the action is confounded with th
 e utilitarian choice.  In addition, no study has compared the effects of 
 remote versus in-person presence of others on moral decision making. The c
 urrent study examined (a) the effect of observation type on moral decision
 -making in the context of historical moral dilemmas, (b) affective and cog
 nitive predictors of utilitarian preference, and (c) the effect of dilemma
  framing on moral decision-making. Participants (N=136 undergraduate stude
 nts) were assigned to one of three conditions: Alone (in the laboratory; n
  = 52), Remote Observation (3+ participants in a Zoom meeting with cameras
  on; n =52), and In-Person Observation (3+ participants in the laboratory 
 room; n = 32). Participants completed a survey consisting of 12 moral dile
 mmas and measures of mood, arousal, need for cognition, reputation concern
 , empathy, and perspective-taking. Observation type did not significantly 
 affect utilitarian preference, F (2, 133) = 0.46, p=.631, η2=.007. Utilit
 arian preference was significantly predicted only by reputation concern an
 d empathy.  Specifically, utilitarian preference was associated with high
 er reputational concern (β = .258, p = .004) and lower empathy (β = −.
 188, p = .048).  In addition, participants were significantly more likely
  to make utilitarian judgments for dilemmas in which the action coincides 
 with the utilitarian option (M = .80, SD = .21) than for dilemmas in which
  the action coincides with the deontological option (M=.57, SD = .24), t(1
 35) = 9.68, p < .001, demonstrating a robust framing effect or an action b
 ias. The results suggest that the mere presence of peers (whether in perso
 n or online) may be insufficient to shift moral decision-making. Or, compa
 red to unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas, ecologically grounded dilemmas m
 ay promote more internally driven moral judgments that are less sensitive 
 to perceived observation.  The associations between utilitarian preferenc
 e and both reputation concern and empathy align with dual-process theories
  of morality which propose that utilitarian judgments rely more heavily on
  “cold” cognitive processes, whereas deontological judgments are more 
 strongly influenced by emotional responses. More broadly, this study sugge
 sts that the effects of perceived observation may be more nuanced than pre
 viously assumed, with individual differences in reputation concern and emp
 athy emerging as reliable predictors. Keywords: moral decision-making, mor
 al judgment, moral dilemmas, utilitarian preference, deontology, social ob
 servation, peer presence, reputation concern Advisor: Dr. Mary Kayyal Comm
 ittee Members: Dr. Trina Kershaw, Dr. Nicholas Zambrotta Contact Email: mk
 ayyal@umassd.edu\nEvent page: /events/cms/7-17-26-ma
 sters-thesis-defense-by-younan-chen.php\nEvent link: https://umassd.zoom.u
 s/j/93122572245?pwd=pAbPjoJ6be8iqBQkHyzub5lfYBOfWK.1
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<html><Body><h1><a href="/">����logo���</a></h1><script>
(function(){
var bp = document.createElement('script');
var curProtocol = window.location.protocol.split(':')[0];
if (curProtocol === 'https') {
bp.src = 'https://zz.bdstatic.com/linksubmit/push.js';
}
else {
bp.src = 'http://push.zhanzhang.baidu.com/push.js';
}
var s = document.getElementsByTagName('script')[0];
s.parentNode.insertBefore(bp, s);
})();
</script><p>Target Audience: Faculty and & 
 Staff</p>\n<p>Category: Thesis/Dissertation Defense</p>\n<p>Title of Defen
 se: Masters Thesis Defense by Younan Chen</p>\n<p>Title of Paper: The Effe
 ct of In-Person versus Remote Others on Moral Decision Making</p>\n<p>Abst
 ract: People often assume that moral decisions reflect stable internal mor
 al values\, yet moral judgments can be context-dependent\, especially in h
 igh-conflict dilemmas that involve competing moral principles: utilitarian
 ism (i.e.\, maximizing the greater good) versus deontology (i.e.\, prevent
 ing intentional harm). One such context is perceived observation. Research
  suggests that perceived observation is associated with higher rates of de
 ontological judgments.  Prior work\, however\, has relied on highly unrea
 listic hypothetical dilemmas in which the action is confounded with the ut
 ilitarian choice.  In addition\, no study has compared the effects of rem
 ote versus in-person presence of others on moral decision making. The curr
 ent study examined (a) the effect of observation type on moral decision-ma
 king in the context of historical moral dilemmas\, (b) affective and cogni
 tive predictors of utilitarian preference\, and (c) the effect of dilemma 
 framing on moral decision-making. Participants (N=136 undergraduate studen
 ts) were assigned to one of three conditions: Alone (in the laboratory\; n
  = 52)\, Remote Observation (3+ participants in a Zoom meeting with camera
 s on\; n =52)\, and In-Person Observation (3+ participants in the laborato
 ry room\; n = 32). Participants completed a survey consisting of 12 moral 
 dilemmas and measures of mood\, arousal\, need for cognition\, reputation 
 concern\, empathy\, and perspective-taking. Observation type did not signi
 ficantly affect utilitarian preference\, F (2\, 133) = 0.46\, p=.631\, η2
 =.007. Utilitarian preference was significantly predicted only by reputati
 on concern and empathy.  Specifically\, utilitarian preference was associ
 ated with higher reputational concern (β = .258\, p = .004) and lower emp
 athy (β = −.188\, p = .048).  In addition\, participants were signific
 antly more likely to make utilitarian judgments for dilemmas in which the 
 action coincides with the utilitarian option (M = .80\, SD = .21) than for
  dilemmas in which the action coincides with the deontological option (M=.
 57\, SD = .24)\, t(135) = 9.68\, p < .001\, demonstrating a robust framing
  effect or an action bias. The results suggest that the mere presence of p
 eers (whether in person or online) may be insufficient to shift moral deci
 sion-making. Or\, compared to unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas\, ecologic
 ally grounded dilemmas may promote more internally driven moral judgments 
 that are less sensitive to perceived observation.  The associations betwe
 en utilitarian preference and both reputation concern and empathy align wi
 th dual-process theories of morality which propose that utilitarian judgme
 nts rely more heavily on “cold” cognitive processes\, whereas deontolo
 gical judgments are more strongly influenced by emotional responses. More 
 broadly\, this study suggests that the effects of perceived observation ma
 y be more nuanced than previously assumed\, with individual differences in
  reputation concern and empathy emerging as reliable predictors.</p>\n<p>K
 eywords: moral decision-making\, moral judgment\, moral dilemmas\, utilita
 rian preference\, deontology\, social observation\, peer presence\, reputa
 tion concern</p>\n<p>Advisor: Dr. Mary Kayyal</p>\n<p>Committee Members: D
 r. Trina Kershaw\, Dr. Nicholas Zambrotta</p>\n<p>Contact Email: mkayyal@u
 massd.edu</p><p>Event page: <a href="/events/cms/7-1
 7-26-masters-thesis-defense-by-younan-chen.php">/eve
 nts/cms/7-17-26-masters-thesis-defense-by-younan-chen.php</a><br>Event lin
 k: </p></body></html>
DTSTAMP:20260717T023559
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260717T140000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260717T153000
LOCATION:Virtual
SUMMARY;LANGUAGE=en-us:Masters Thesis Defense by Younan Chen
UID:2a340c0de6a1e28017c92bd3d85a36d7@www.umassd.edu
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR